HOW FAR WILL YOU GO WHEN THERE IS AN EMBARGO?A STOCHASTIC ACTOR-ORIENTED MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF ARMS EMBARGOS ON  ILLICIT WEAPONS TRADE by Hagala, Jennifer A
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations Office of Graduate Studies 
6-2017 
HOW FAR WILL YOU GO WHEN THERE IS AN EMBARGO?A 
STOCHASTIC ACTOR-ORIENTED MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF 
ARMS EMBARGOS ON ILLICIT WEAPONS TRADE 
Jennifer A. Hagala 
Jennifer Hagala, hagalaj@coyote.csusb.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd 
 Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hagala, Jennifer A., "HOW FAR WILL YOU GO WHEN THERE IS AN EMBARGO?A STOCHASTIC ACTOR-
ORIENTED MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF ARMS EMBARGOS ON ILLICIT WEAPONS TRADE" (2017). 
Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations. 538. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/538 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Graduate Studies at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
HOW FAR WILL YOU GO WHEN THERE IS AN EMBARGO? 
A STOCHASTIC ACTOR-ORIENTED MODEL OF THE  
EFFECTS OF ARMS EMBARGOS ON  
ILLICIT WEAPONS TRADE 
 
 
A Thesis Presented to the 
Faculty of  
California State University, 
San Bernardino 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
in 
Criminal Justice 
 
 
by 
Jennifer Ann Hagala 
June 2017 
 HOW FAR WILL YOU GO WHEN THERE IS AN EMBARGO? 
A STOCHASTIC ACTOR-ORIENTED MODEL OF THE  
EFFECTS OF ARMS EMBARGOS ON  
ILLICIT WEAPONS TRADE 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Faculty of 
California State University, 
San Bernardino 
 
 
by 
Jennifer Ann Hagala 
June 2017 
 
Approved by: 
Dr. Gisela M. Bichler, Committee Chair, Criminal Justice 
Dr. Nerea Marteache, Committee Member 
Dr. Deborah A. Parsons, Committee Member 
  
 
 
 
 
 
© 2017 Jennifer Ann Hagala 
 
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
The international community routinely implements embargoes in an effort 
to restrict the flow of small arms and light weapons into politically unstable 
regions. The effectiveness of sanctions fall into question when reports indicate 
that weapons continue to pour into embargoed territories. Using stochastic actor-
based modeling, the current study investigates how shipment patterns change 
over time, and how trade patterns evolve in the presence of endogenous 
influences, such as embargoes, while controlling for corruption levels and 
national wealth (e.g., gross domestic product). The analysis here indicated that 
embargoes did have an effect in diverting illicit weapons trade through indirect 
ties. This was seen highest during the embargo implementation period and post 
embargo implementation period. The results stand to improve our understanding 
of this complex illegal global market and the role national control of corruption 
and gross domestic product play in the enforceability of these sanctions. In the 
final analysis what was discovered was that embargoes do effect change in the 
illegal arms trade network. This effect is seen in the form of indirect ties to end 
user countries. This suggests that improvements to policies and regulation on 
transshipment points need to be highly scrutinized.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Case Study 
When political instability generates significant civilian casualties and 
human rights violations, the global outcry for intervention often leads to efforts to 
control the flow of weapons into the region, usually by way of embargos.  As 
illustrated in the following example of the civil war in Sierra Leone, trade is 
difficult to control due to the complexity of the supply network. 
The violence in Sierra Leone during its ten-year civil war against rebel 
fighters in the early 1990s was fueled by the diamond mines, which produced 
millions of dollars in profits from diamonds every year. The core rebel group that 
gained control over the mines through rape, murder, and other human rights 
violations was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Many of the soldiers 
recruited to the RUF were promised money, drugs, and sex slaves. Some 
soldiers were forced to fight, including children who were often given drugs 
before being sent out to the front lines. One of the leaders, Foday Sankoh, a 
former military leader within Sierra Leone, received support from countries such 
as Liberia, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. This support continued in the form of 
weapon supplies in exchange for diamonds as the conflict progressed. 
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Despite the use of United Nations arms embargoes against the RUF, 
foreign support started in the early 1990s and continued through the early 2000s. 
While Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Senegal were the direct suppliers of arms going 
into Sierra Leone, these countries were not where all of the shipments originated. 
Figure 1 shows that some of the shipments came from as far away as the 
Ukraine, where government officials stated in their end-user paperwork that the 
recipient of the weapons was not Sierra Leone or RUF rebels. This statement 
allowed them to deflect any responsibility when dealing with countries that had 
arms embargoes on them. Although several of the leaders from the RUF group 
have since been held responsible for human rights’ violations and stood trial, 
security and stability within the region continues to be a problem. 
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Figure 1. Map of Arms Shipments into Sierra Leone From Other Countries 
 
 
The lighter areas are the initial transfers from supplier countries, while the darker 
red indicates the final transfers to RUF. 
Transshipment, moving weapons through indirect shipping channels, 
changes the status of weapons from legal to illegal. For example, a weapons 
transfer from Ukraine to Burkina Faso can be legal when shippers file appropriate 
paper with the relevant authorities and the end-user is listed as being in Burkina 
Faso. In most cases, the weapons do arrive in Burkina Faso as intended, but 
they are quickly transferred to Sierra Leone through illegal means and/or through 
a staged robbery of the weapons. The impact that this practice has is 
devastating. 
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Small arms and light weapons (SALW) were defined by the United Nations 
General Assembly in August 1997 as, 
Small arms and light weapons range from clubs, knives and 
machetes…those covered by the United Nations Register or Conventional 
Arms, for example, mortars below the caliber of 100mm, which are 
manufactured to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war. 
Types of weapons included in this category of arms includes: revolvers, self-
loading pistols, rifles, shotguns, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, mounted 
grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless 
rifles, portable launchers, etc. 
Illicit SALW were responsible for an average of 535,000 deaths each year 
from 2010 to 2015. When the number of permanent physical and psychological 
injuries accrued from the armed conflict is considered, the number of victims is 
significantly higher. For every fatal injury from a firearm, there are 20 to 40 non-
fatal injuries caused by firearms (WHO, 2002). We must also consider the human 
costs associated with armed conflict. There are currently 39 million children living 
in conflict areas with no access to education, health services, or proper nutritional 
meals (Leff & Moestue, 2009). Nations with long-standing instability and 
corruption can become saturated with SALW, which further destabilizes the 
region. 
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Trade Restrictions 
Weapon producing nations, such as the United States, Italy, and Belgium 
often discontinue shipments of military aid to conflict regions, such as Sierra 
Leone, when gross human rights’ violations are discovered. When industry self-
regulation fails, and SALW continues to flow into regions embroiled in armed 
conflict, nations enact arms embargoes. They occur unilaterally to prohibit 
weapons transfers from companies operating in the home state, regionally with 
multinational agreements, or globally with trade sanctions posed by the United 
Nations Security Council. For example, the U.S. State Department currently lists 
26 countries that are under some form of weapons’ embargoes. The United 
Nations has 15 different embargoes in place worldwide, and the European Union 
(EU) currently has 22 different embargoes in place for countries, states, and non-
government entities. 
 
Embargoes 
 Each embargo, and the rules surrounding it, is different depending on the 
situation in the country at the time. For example, President John F. Kennedy 
enacted a 1962 economic embargo on Cuba. One of the conditions made to 
release the embargo on Cuba is that the Castro Regime can no longer be in 
power. Another example is the United Nations arms embargo placed against 
Iran. If Iran complies with certain restrictions to their nuclear program, this 
embargo may be lifted or become less restrictive. More recently, embargoes 
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were placed on Syria. These sanctions were implemented because the Syrian 
government continues to support known terrorist groups, trying to procure 
weapons of mass destruction, and to threaten international security. With the 
widespread use of embargoes, the need becomes even greater to understand if 
these forms of behavior modification are effective. 
Arms embargoes are often referred to as “smart sanctions” due to their 
targeted nature. Rather than prohibiting all goods and services from going into a 
country, arms embargoes restrict specific commerce thereby allowing the 
continuance of essential trade. For example, sanctions made against a particular 
country could stipulate that exporting arms to country A is a violation rendering 
the exporter liable for sanctions; however, exports of humanitarian aid would not 
be restricted. Arms embargos often target a particular country, territory, state, or 
non-state entity involved in human rights’ violations. 
Why these weapons continue to reach illicit end users despite embargoes, 
plagues the international community. A possible explanation may come from the 
work of Bichler and Malm (2015). These authors combine two theoretical 
approaches, and in so doing, identify elements of the civic infrastructure that 
influence crime control, as well as entities that straddle illicit and legal trade at 
the transnational level, that may offer insight into why weapons continue to flow.  
First, Bichler and Malm (2015) extend the work of Sampson, Eck and 
Dunham, (2010) to the international arena. Sampson et al (2010) argued that the 
set of crime controllers identified by routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 
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1979; Eck, 1995, 2002; Felson, 1995, 2006; Felson and Cohen, 1980), required 
rethinking. These authors introduced the idea that super controllers create the 
framework within which the primary crime controllers operate—the primary 
controllers being intimate handlers, guardians, and place managers. At the 
national level, through private and civil regulatory infrastructures super controllers 
provide the incentive for primary controllers to be more effective. Various 
mechanisms of influence exist--economic, social, political, formal justice—that 
can exert pressure on primary controllers.  
Insight also comes from the lock model. Bichler and Malm (2015) argue 
that the transnational commerce is not dichotomized into legal and illicit activity, 
rather, commerce exists on a continuum of legality. Drawing upon the lock model 
proposed by Tijhuis (2006, 2011), they explain that illicit and legal trade is fused 
through individuals, companies, and nations positioned to exploit asymmetries 
between nations, routinely moving commodities through an illicitization process 
or cleaning product, through a laundering process. At any one time, trade brokers 
can be engaged in both legal and illicit transactions. Goods can move from illegal 
goods to legal markets and vice versa.  These brokers are also subject to the 
influence, or the lack of attention, of super controllers. This theoretical approach 
will be discussed further in the discussion to explain network change and how 
that change is influenced by the presences of embargoes.  
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The Current Study 
The purpose of the current study is to understand how the structure of 
illicit weapons’ trade changes in response to the imposition of embargoes. Using 
stochastic actor-based models, the primary objective is to isolate the effect of 
embargoes on the local weapons trade network while controlling local conditions 
(e.g., control of corruption) and evolution in trade activity at the global level (e.g., 
reciprocal trade agreements). Embargoes are modeled as a stochastic shock to 
the trade system with three phases: Phase 1 is the period two years before an 
embargo is enacted, Phase 2 is during the embargo, and Phase 3 is the two 
years following the lifting of the weapons trade sanction. 
In addition to capturing how the trade network evolves with structural 
statistics (i.e., will it become denser with more connections or will relationships 
dissolve or become stronger over time?) (Kinsella, 2003; Moore, 2010), several 
explanatory variables and interaction terms will be included. Two indicators, 
control of corruption and GDP will be used to evaluate a country’s willingness to 
comply with an embargo. To advance the field, this research uses a unique data 
source. The data used in this study were compiled from several different sources 
including investigative reports by the Small Arms Survey, United Nations 
Commodity Trade database, as well as a systematic search for news articles 
from LexisNexis for reports of weapons seizures. 
The results of this study will contribute to a growing body of work 
investigating the complexity of illicit markets, particularly SALW trade (e.g., 
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Bichler & Franquez, 2014; Kinsella, 2004; Kinsella, 2008). Dynamic modeling will 
allow for one to not only evaluate the effectiveness of the arms embargoes, but 
will show researchers specifically how trade is shifting over time due to 
embargoes. This data should bring to the forefront the issue of how corruption 
and GDP effect decisions on arms trading at the state level. Network modeling of 
the illicit small arms trade will equip policy makers with a new evaluation tool so 
that effective policies can be implemented that make enforcement possible. 
 
 Outline 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter Two provides 
a primer about embargoes and their effectiveness. Then, the discussion turns to 
how illicit and licit markets relate to each other, and how political relationships 
can feed into a country’s willingness to trade in the illicit arms market. Next, there 
is a short explanation of network analysis, with terms and definitions outlined for 
the purpose of the study. Chapter Two concludes with a review of the prior 
research on weapons trade using network analysis. Chapter Three describes 
how the illicit trade network was mapped and validated, the structural metrics 
used to assess evolution in the trade network, the covariates, and analytic 
process. Chapter Four presents the results of the analysis and Chapter Five 
includes a discussion of the implications these findings have, the limitations of 
the current study, and directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Primer About Embargoes 
Simply put, “arms embargoes are one type of sanction that can be used to 
coerce states and non-governmental actors to improve their behavior in the 
interests of international peace and security” (Stockhom International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), 2016). The UN Security Council is the primary 
organization involved in launching initiatives to set weapons embargoes on 
specific nations for severe human rights’ violations and/or international peace 
and security issues. Although the European Union and the United States will at 
times implement their own arms embargos on a particular country, most begin 
with investigations by the UN Security Council. 
Several steps must be taken before an embargo can be established. First, 
a peacekeeping mission of the member states’ military personnel may be sent to 
the region in order to obtain a better understanding of the situation in the region 
and to provide much needed medical and food supplies to those in the area. This 
may be followed by a request to the UN Secretary General to obtain a UN 
ceasefire directive. If these steps are not affective, then several types of 
sanctions may be enacted including economic sanctions, arms embargos, 
financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans, severance of diplomatic relations, 
a blockade, and/or collective military action by UN member states. The 
11 
 
motivation behind the scheme of escalating sanctions is to induce change, 
especially when the human rights’ violations are associated with state-sponsored 
or enabled violations such as rape, mass killing, starvation, or enslavement. 
 
Embargoes Defined 
Embargoes can be unilateral or multilateral. Unilateral sanctions prohibit 
or control sales from one nation that imposes the embargo on another nation, 
group, or organization. An example of a unilateral embargo is the economic 
sanction the United States has had on Cuba. This sanction was put into place by 
President Kennedy and remains in place today. Most recently, specific trading 
has been opened with Cuba but on a very limited basis (Federal Registry, Vol 81, 
and No.17). Multilateral embargoes involve a set of nations agreeing to an 
embargo against one other state, group, or organization. An example of a 
multilateral embargo would be the embargo placed on Afghanistan, and more 
specifically, the embargo placed on the Taliban who reside in Afghanistan and 
have central control over people, movement of people and goods, and 
government facilities. This embargo was adopted and put into place by the UN 
Security Council resolution 1076 in 1996. Resolution 1076 calls all member 
states to cease the export of all military aid to the area and calls the warring 
government to ceasefire and peacefully resolve their issues through political and 
diplomatic means (Security Council Resolution 1076). 
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Prior research has examined the scope of embargoes that only restrict 
one type of trade compared to those prohibiting all trade. Erickson found that 
partial and impartial embargoes differ in their effectiveness (Erickson, 2013; 
Cukier, 2008; Akerman and Seim, 2014). They found that partial embargoes are 
more likely to decrease the flow of arms into the area. Impartial embargoes target 
all involved in the conflict, while partial embargoes target a very specific group or 
side in the conflict. Currently there are impartial sanctions for weapons and 
military assistance that prohibit all trade of any kind to the following countries: 
Burma (Myanmar), Cuba (as stated earlier some trade within the last 9 months 
has been opened up to Cuba), Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Partial sanctions target 
very specific trade. Currently only Lebanon and Libya have partial sanctions. US 
held sanctions are present for all of the countries listed above. In the case of 
Rwanda, in 1994 partial embargoes were implemented on specific state actors 
as well as adjacent states to keep arms from flowing through neighboring borders 
(Tierney, 2005).  
Enforcement  
The enforcement of any embargo is partially the responsibility of the 
government where the violation originates. In most cases, individuals, groups or 
organizations violating the trade ban can be fined, individuals may receive prison 
terms, or both can be implemented. When the responsible party is a high-ranking 
official under a corrupt government, the UN can appoint judges to special 
criminal courts to prosecute those that commit human rights’ violations. It should 
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also be noted that trades may start off as legal shipments, but due to falsified end 
user papers or diversion of shipments it becomes an illicit trade through the 
process (Tijhuis, 2006, 2011). This means that parties that maybe involved or 
shady trades may not be fully aware of their participation, or use this a diffusion 
of responsibility.  
To illustrate, according to the US Department of the Treasury, the current 
weapons sanction that is held against North Korea has been continually 
expanded since 2008 by the President of the United States through executive 
orders to mitigate the security threat from this country. Penalties for violating 
these sanctions start at $250,000 or twice the amount of the transaction or can 
be up to $1,000,000 and/or 20 years in prison. United States officials can enforce 
these executive orders. These expansion on the sanctions continue due to the 
receiving party non-cooperation with the first steps taken.  
 As previously discussed this illegal trade can be conducted in such a way 
that it starts to blur the lines between legal and illegal transaction. All parties 
involved don’t have full knowledge of what is occurring, making enforcement 
even more difficult. The routine activities of these traders can be leveraged to 
come up with passive enforcement techniques.  
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Effectiveness of SALW Embargoes 
Returning to the case study, illegal guns continued to pour into Sierra 
Leone despite the use of arms embargoes. In 2000, the UN made several new 
recommendations. For example, they required more inspections of planes and 
documentation by airport investigators. Although some private dealers had fines 
imposed on them for changing plane numbers and registration paperwork, this 
did not stop or discourage the import and export of arms. These fines appeared 
to be a minor inconvenience to arms dealers. The UN report also recommended 
freezing specific government and non-government actors’ assets in order to try to 
stop the financial supply for weapons into Sierra Leone. The ineffectiveness of 
the UN recommendations may partly be due to the fact that the sanctions 
committee is made of junior staff members at the UN that typically have a higher 
turnover rate (Vines, 2007). A high turnover rate can impede follow-up on 
sanctions and impede continued involvement that would ensure the evolving 
environment is addressed as it changes. In the original resolution by the UN on 
the conditions in Sierra Leone, it is clearly stated that they determined “that the 
situation in Sierra Leone constitutes a threat to International peace and security 
in the region.” (Security Council Resolution 1076, 1996)Yet in the resolution, the 
states are told to self-regulate with the UN committee acting only as a “watch 
dog.” Functions of the committee include following up on reports of violations by 
states and entities, but fails to establish any consequences for violators. During a 
briefing in New York in 2000 by Human Rights Watch, it was stated that the 
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committee established for the Sierra Leone arms embargo failed to even 
investigate any reports of violations. The briefing further stated that due to the 
peace talks that were occurring the committee did not want to upset the RUF by 
conducting investigations on allegations of weapon procurement from 
neighboring countries (A Human Rights Watch Press Briefing, May 15, 2000). 
This self-regulation was further re-enforced in a summit meeting held in New 
York in 2001 regarding the global illicit manufacturing and trade of small arms 
and light weapons, stating 
Believing that Governments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, 
combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all 
its aspects and, accordingly, should intensify their efforts to define the problems 
associated with such trade and find ways of resolving them. (UN Document 
A/CONF.192/15)  
The degree to which nation-states prosecute violators varies creating 
loopholes for the private supply of small arms. This opens the discussion that a 
normalized legal approach to criminal enforcement of embargo violations. Some 
states like the US have specialized departments to deal with illegal import and 
export violations conducted by businesses when the mother corporation resides 
within the US. Since 1995, the US Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) has 
prosecuted 68 criminal cases of violations of these sanctions. Sanctioning 
entities in violation of weapons embargos is complicated when the government 
itself is breaking an embargo or sanction when it should be enforcing the rules. 
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Who is going to enforce those violations? The monitoring committees are often 
made of groups that only have a 6-month lifespan, creating instability in the 
enforcement of the embargo. These monitoring committees have also historically 
lacked transparency due to confidentiality (Yihdego, Z. 2007). 
Security concerns may cause a state to illegally trade with an embargoed 
state if their own concerns outweigh the cost of being seen as having bad 
behavior in the global community (Erickson, 2013). There is no international 
enforcement agency that is going to regulate the compliance of other states with 
an embargo. Simply, the “golden rule” is applied which means that everyone 
“agrees not to do it”. In some cases, levels of corruption or long-standing 
relationships with the sanctioned state may supersede any type of penalty that 
has been more recently imposed (Bresson-Cartier, 1997). Ultimately, embargoes 
are the international communities’ way to shame the behavior of a particular 
group or nation state in order to bring about change in that behavior.   
 While invoking arms embargoes is generally thought to decrease the loss 
of human life by controlling access to weapons, ammunition, and associated 
arms parts, few empirical studies exist to document their effectiveness (Erickson, 
2013). Instead, the available literature paints a complex picture of globalized 
illegal smuggling and institutionalized corruption. For example, smart sanctions 
can be bypassed with weapons labeled as “humanitarian aid” or simply by 
counterfeiting shipping paperwork (Kinsella, 2006). As one can quickly see from 
the review of documents from the UN specifically pertaining to the conflict in 
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Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council is reliant on states as self-regulators using 
committees that tend to have failed to follow-up on resolutions (S/RES/1270, 
1999). Research shows that there is some form of compliance with the 
embargoes but to what degree that compliance is achieved is still debated 
among scholars (Bresson-Cartier, 1997; Tierney, 2005; Moore, 2010; Erickson, 
2013). Erickson found that the partial embargo was more effective than an 
embargo that was just a blanket of all trade restrictions (Erikson, 2013). Even 
that doesn’t fully tell one what the embargo is doing to change the network.  The 
question addressed here becomes if one knows that the embargo is only 
somewhat effective, then how are trade patterns changing that allow the flow of 
weapons to still enter the sanctioned areas? In this study, we examine other 
variables that could contribute to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
embargoes. Obviously, in some cases the UN and other government agencies 
are well aware that bordering states can facilitate illegal weapons transfer 
allowing arms to reach sanctioned states (Tierney, 2005; Bichler & Franquez, 
2014). Other important factors in that affect the flow of arms and the willingness 
of nation states to comply with a current embargo include corruption and GDP as 
stated by Bresson-Cartier (Bresson-Cartier, 1997). 
Erickson conducted one of the most rigorous assessments of embargo 
effects (Erickson, 2013). Using a multi-variate regression and moving OLS 
regression analysis found that partial sanctions reduced trade by 3.4% and full 
sanctions reduced trade by 5.8%. An explanation for the failure of weapons’ 
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embargoes to stop flow across borders may be found in the work of Bichler and 
colleagues (Bichler and Malm, 2013; Bichler and Franquez, 2014). Arguing that 
legal and illegal markets are intertwined together, Bichler and Malm document 
the “grayness” of the weapons’ market (Bichler and Malm, 2013). They argue 
that the industry of small arms’ trade includes secondary “producers” that enable 
small arms to continue to be recirculated (i.e., maintenance, reassembly, and 
repair). Future sanctions should include actors in the secondary market to inhibit 
the flow of small arms into a particular area. Additionally, this “black, white, and 
gray” market of weapons’ trading is often the result of weapons’ stockpiles left 
over from previous conflicts. 
Importantly, countries that are coming out of a conflict may find that they 
lack the funds to rebuild infrastructure and so turn to the most viable commodity 
that they now have available, which may be stockpiles of weapons (Bichler & 
Franquez, 2014). Bichler and Franquez discovered that the likelihood that trade 
would increase was 81% immediately following the end of a conflict (2014). This 
uncovers gateways which could facilitate the transfer of legal weapons into the 
gray or black market, if the weapons then continue to be traded illegally. In this 
respect, weapon stockpiles are a national commodity (Bichler and Franquez, 
2014). Auditing weapon stockpiles may be a promising strategy to strengthen 
weapons controls. Thus, instead of trying to completely stop illicit arms trade, 
perhaps a more successful strategy would be to examine sanction behaviors 
rather than looking for the secession of all trade. Although this shows great 
19 
 
promise for embargoes thereby decreasing the loss of human life and suffering, 
one must ask what additional factors may contribute to the willingness of certain 
countries to comply with arms embargoes compared to those that do not. 
 In previous research, a country’s political standing was found to influence 
whether a particular country chose to trade and whether or not that country was 
willing to violate sanctions in order to maintain a trading relationship (Bresson-
Cartier, 1997; Akerman and Seim, 2014). Countries that share land borders or 
have long-standing relationships, such as colonial ties, are more likely to 
continue to trade with one another (Moore, 2010; Akerman and Seim, 2014). 
Interestingly, the political standing of a country was found to have the highest 
effect on the choice of whether to trade with another country. Simply 
implementing an embargo was not enough to change the political landscape of a 
country or their willingness to discontinue what may have been a long-standing 
geo-political relationship. Other important factors that play a role in the 
willingness to comply with a sanction include the level of a corruption in the 
government. 
Bresson-Cartier found that these long-established relationships play a 
major role in a country’s, nations, or territory’s motivation to comply with the rules 
and to turn in those that are willing to break the rules (Bresson-Cartier, 1997). 
Once the level of corruption increases in a country, sanctions no longer become 
a factor in the decision-making process to illegally trade with another country, 
state or territory. Bresson-Cartier states that the risk for illegal trading does not 
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outweigh the benefits of the long-term relationship (Bresson-Cartier, 1997). This 
can also be applied to the motivation to turn in one’s “friend”- the short-term 
benefit does not outweigh the benefits to a continued relationship. Moore (2010) 
used a two-step modeling approach, using maximum-likelihood and ordinary 
least squares (OLS), to model the decision-making process on whether or not to 
transfer arms and the size of a transfer. Moore states that these decisions are 
crucial in understanding why states are willing to violate sanctions, because he 
found that small transfers to embargoed states seem like less of a violation than 
large transfers: Active embargoes reduce the size of shipments, but weapons 
continue to flow into the sanctioned areas.  
In sum, studies find some evidence that although embargoes have some 
effect, illegal trade continues (Moore, 2010; Erickson, 2013). Given the 
complexity of global illegal markets, and the interconnections between nations 
formed by long-term relations and alliances, mapping how trade patterns are 
influenced by embargos requires a dynamic analysis of the evolution of trade 
behavior.  
 
Brief Discussion on Network Analysis and Illegal Markets 
To assist the reader, this section defines key network terms with visual 
examples. Then, there is a discussion on why the network approach is important 
to the study of illegal markets. Finally, this section explains how the dynamic 
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environment in which arms trade occurs can be modeled better with graphs than 
with conventional analytic approaches. 
Social network analysis (SNA), is an interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary field 
of study investigating how social units (e.g., individuals, groups, companies, or 
nations) interact with each other, and how the social structure created by these 
relations both constrains and enables behavior, and spreads information, 
resources, and other materials. SNA looks at how and why those relationships 
changes, and what influences those changes. Using routines activity theory to 
examine social network analysis has been brought to the attention of criminal 
justice researchers in prior arguments (e.g., Bichler and Malm, 2014). Originally 
routine activities was applied to what one might look at as low level crimes 
(Cohen and Fleson, 1979), these are the type of criminal activities such as 
robbery, burlgery, assault or neighborhood drug pushing. This theory was later 
applied to transnational crime level by Sampson, Eck and Dunham, (2010). 
These researchers brought the idea of super controllers to Cohen and Felson’s 
original crime triangle, creating a leveling effect to the equation. What this also 
did was create better perspective on the different levels of crime. To paraphrase 
when one is looking at a high-level crime such as global weapons trade you must 
look down to gain better perspective, and when one is looking at a micro level of 
criminal behavior you must look up. Bichler and Malm later applied these ideas to 
network analysis as a way of looking at solutions to transnational criminal 
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behavior. This idea will also be discussed more in a later chapter when policy 
implications are discussed.  
 
Network Terms and Definitions 
Unlike conventional research the primary unit of analysis in network 
research is a dyad, comprised of two actors and the relationship between them, 
or a triad including three actors and the existence of relations among them. 
Actors, referred to as nodes, can represent any social entity. In this study, actors 
are nations, states, countries, or territories. Relations between actors are often 
called ties. Ties can represent many different types of interactions, such as a 
legal relationship (i.e., kinship, contracted partnership), a feeling (i.e., liking 
someone), or the transmission of some product or service (i.e., information flow, 
drug supply chain). In applying social network methods to the study of weapons 
markets, most researchers use ties to represent the transfer of weapons from the 
exporting nation to the importing nation. This means the relation is directed. 
When visualizing a directional relationship, an arrow is used to show the direction 
of the relationship. If commodities flow both ways, a double-headed arrow is 
used. See Appendix A for full list of definitions with illustrations.  
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Matrix Explained 
Relationships are represented in a matrix format, with rows and columns 
for every actor in the network. The rows in the matrix represent the actor that is 
the Ego in the relationship. The Ego in the relationship in this study is the country 
that is sending out weapons, while the Alter receives weapons (see Table 1). 
Table 1 represents the flow of weapons using the Sierra Leone case study. 
 
 
Table 1. Matrix of Current Case Study 
 
 
 
The “ones” and “zeroes” are binary for the existence of a trade relation. 
Let us first examine the trading patterns of Sierra Leone as an Ego. Sierra Leone 
only receives imports from surrounding countries by the presence of a “1” in the 
column, but does not export which is represented by the presence of “0” in the 
rows (Table 1). The number of direct trade connections a nation has can be 
measured with a statistic called degree centrality. In a directed network, the 
Bulgaria (Alter) Senegal Slovakia Gambia Sierra Leone Libya Liberia Cote D'Ivoire Burkina Faso Ukraine
Bulgaria (EGO) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Gambia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Liberia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Cote D'Ivoire 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
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direction of a trade relation is captured. Thus, imports are the “in-degree” of the 
country, while rows represent the “out-degree” or export from the country. In this 
example, nations cannot have a trading relationship themselves, but this is not 
true for all networks. Recursive relationships, a nation shipping to itself, exist in a 
trade network if a nation re-imports and re-exports to themselves (i.e., a country 
sends out military aid to another country and then some weapons are returned 
later due to defect or not used.   
 
Network Oriented Study of Illicit Weapons Trade 
Network analysis examining the weapons trade confirms that global 
weapons’ markets consist of complex, business, social, and political relationships 
(Kinsella, 2003). In some cases these weapons trades go from legal to illegal 
trade and back again within the same transaction (Bichler and Malm, 2013; 
Tijhuis, 2006;Tijhuis, 2011). It has been argued that out of $4 billion dollars in 
annual trading in small arms about 10-20% of that trading occurs in the black and 
gray markets (Kinsella, 2008). These underground markets are not only 
controlled by supply and demand but also by trust and loyalty (Kinsella, 2008). 
Kinsella quantified how relationships could influence the interactions of 
state actors when looking at weapons trade over a 50-year period after the cold 
war (Kinsella, 2003). What he found was that the network significantly changed 
over this period. Kinsella found that the suppliers became less centralized: The 
amount of weapons increased, as more suppliers entered the market. This 
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decentralization may be attributed to globalization changes in world markets 
during the 50-year study period. Some of Kinsella’s earlier work suggested that 
trading behavior could also be examined from a rational-choice perspective, with 
the actors taking the benefits and consequences into consideration with each 
trading partner (Kinsella, 1998). Kinsella also looked at the influence that small 
arms trade had on particular actors’ foreign policies (Kinsella, 1998). What he 
found was that the more weapons the actor was able to obtain the more 
aggressive the policies became. Just as Kinsella was able to make this 
connection between weapons procurement and foreign policy, the current study 
looks to examine weapons trading in a way that will allow policy makers to more 
effectively implement rules and regulations, which should help to curve the flow 
of illegal weapons. 
Analysis of the black market of illegal weapons trading should not be 
viewed as a traditional market place where people, places, and things have a 
hierarchy or order to them. The illegal trade of small arms should be considered 
a true network (Kinsella and Carr, 2007). Kinsella states that centralized hubs 
may exist, with those that supply weapons and those who facilitate the exchange 
between two countries, and there may be those countries within the network that 
control more of the flow of goods or information but not have total control 
(Kinsella, 2007). An ever-changing environment continues to drive what has 
been supported in prior research. Legal and illegal markets can be thought of as 
interchanging relationships, so that black and white produces “gray” markets 
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where transactions are not fully illegal but the entire “legalness” of the transaction 
may be questioned (Kinsella, 2007; Bichler & Malm, 2013; Akerman and Seim, 
2014; Bichler and Franquez, 2014). The illicit weapons trade is an aggregated 
view of much smaller steps and convergence points. The routine activities of 
those smaller points in time and space is what creates the totality of the trade. 
 Routine activities theory was original presented by Cohen and Felson 
(1979) this theory states that when a crime occurs that there is present a suitable 
target, motivated offender and the lack of a capable guardian. That when these 
three converge in time and space that is when a potential criminal act will occur. 
All three of these entities are going about their normal routine activities when this 
convergence occurs. Cohen and Felson state that a motivated offender is not an 
individual that goes out seeking to commit a criminal act but during their normal 
routines an opportunity presents its’ self. The same is true for the suitable target, 
those people, places or things that lack appropriate guardian; either active or 
passive, that are attractive for victimization, whatever form that takes. What 
Cohen and Felson states is that there are preventative measure that can be 
implemented to create barriers to criminal acts in the routine activities. When 
considering a motivated offender, the term intimate handler is used to refer to 
those persona or agency that possesses some type of control over the motivated 
offender. This idea was taken a step further by Sampson, Eck and Dunham 
(2010), with the idea of super controllers.  
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Super controllers are those individuals, mechanisms, or process that have 
some type of influence over the three primary crime controllers. This influence 
comes in many forms, e.g., private sector regulations, public sector regulations, 
or checks and balances that will natural/passively inhibit the falsification of 
documents. The use of social network analysis with routine activities theory has 
been supported in prior research by Bichler and Malm (2014, 2015). Bichler and 
Malm (2015) extend the role of super controllers to the transnational arena while 
integrating Tijhuis’ lock model (Tijhuis, 2006, 2011).  
Tijhuis’ lock model uses the illustration of a shipping lock to represent how 
legal and illegal markets have a gray area where they mix and then become legal 
or illegal. The brokers within the network facilitate the movement of levers in 
order to allow legal products to flow into this middle area and then flow into illegal 
markets and vice versa. Thus, investigating illegal trade activity requires 
integration of all market activity--legal, grey, and illicit activity (Bichler and Malm, 
2013).When thinking about the global illicit weapons trade one needs to look at 
the smaller components as well as the larger ones that make this a criminal act. 
Appendix B shows the system break down for global illicit weapons trade and 
how different components come together and are tied to the system. Routine 
activities theory will be applied to the following results with policy implications that 
will be discussed further in the final chapter of the current study.  
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The Current Study 
The lock model was chosen an appropriate way to capture illicit trade 
activity for this study, by separating legal and illegal trading activity. In some 
cases no import or export was reported for one of the countries in the trade. 
However, this data will not capture individual dealer activity, which is something 
that should be examined in future research. Once all illegal trade is identified for 
the study period, this will become the illegal arms trading network and the 
change within the trade pattern will be the dependent variable for this research 
project. The independent variables for this study will be embargoes, corruption, 
and GDP. 
 When assessing the impact of embargoes researchers must understand 
the extent of legal and illegal trade of weapons interchange that occurs between 
countries (Bichler and Malm, 2013). Understanding the interaction of weapons 
trading in black and gray markets is a unique field of study. To examine this issue 
comprehensively requires the use of unconventional analysis such as network 
analysis approaches (Kinsella, 2003; Kinsella, 2007). In addition, based on the 
study conducted by Bichler and Franquez in 2014, when considering the post 
economic crash of 2008 one would expect to see an increase in tie formation. 
Just as the end of conflict brings about an increase in out-degree and new tie 
formations due to economic recovery after the conflict situation, one would 
expect to see these same types of changes after an economic crash that had 
such a profound rippling effect throughout the world economy. Controlling for 
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expected structural evolution that occurs within most social networks, two 
hypotheses will be tested in this study using a multivariate model: 
H1  Controlling for fiscal health, GDP, and ability to control corruption, 
nations under embargo will exhibit greater change in trade activity 
with a preference towards indirect ties.  
H2  Controlling for fiscal health, GDP, and ability to control corruption, 
nations will exhibit a preference for indirect transfers when 
embargos are lifted (post-embargo period).  
H3 Nations under fiscal duress will exhibit greater change.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 Data Sources 
Original  
Much of the data used in this study (four of the five data files), were 
originally compiled in 2015 as part of the Weapons Trade Initiative, which is 
housed in the Center for Criminal Justice Research. Given the differences in 
study objectives, significant data manipulation and extraction was required to 
configure the files for use in the present study. Since this is a dynamic analysis, 
data were coded yearly to permit investigation of how the illegal market changes 
(dependent variable), how those changes are influenced by the presence of 
embargoes (independent variable), controlling for national fiscal health—GDP 
score (control variable) and impact of the economic crisis (control variable 
created for this thesis)—and ability to control corruption (control variable). 
Study Period 
The study period extends from 2005 through 2013. This timeframe was 
selected to control for the effect of the economic crash that occurred in 2008. The 
economic crisis of 2008 had a rippling effect on the global economy, and since 
the focus of this project is to identify factors that could change trading behavior 
over time, it is critical to control for this event. Prior weapons’ trade research 
found that major events like the economic crash of 2008 can generate stochastic 
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shocks in the trade system that must be controlled for, to isolate the effects of the 
primary independent variable. While prior weapons’ trade research controlled for 
the introduction of conflict into a region (Kinsella, 2003), it is fair to say that the 
economic crash in the US influenced global legal trading, and as previously 
stated legal and illegal markets have a fluid relationship (Bichler and Malm, 
2013). With the US controlling almost half of the import and export of weapons 
traded globally, as well as influencing trade patterns based on its own trading 
decisions (Kinsella, 2003; Bichler and Malm, 2013), economic instability in the 
US could have global ramifications that must be accounted for. 
 
Weapons Transfer Data 
Weapons trade data were originally compiled from the UN Commodity 
(UNCOM) trade database. This is a voluntary reporting system that allows 
countries to report all imports and exports to other states, countries, and/or 
territories, and it currently collects information from 189 states, countries, and 
territories. There are currently 107,874 records of arms and ammunition trades 
located under Code 93 of the UNCOM database. Under this category “arms” 
includes several types of SALW. Military grade weapons will be the type of 
weapon used for this study with the following codes: 9301 (military weapons 
other than hand guns, swords, etc.), 9302 (revolvers and pistols), 9304 (spring, 
air, or gas guns, truncheons, etc.), 9305 (parts and parts associated with 
weapons), 9306 (bombs, grenades, mines, missiles, and similar munitions of war 
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and parts thereof, cartridges, and other ammunitions and projectiles, and parts 
thereof including shot and cartridge wads), and 9307 (swards, cutlasses, 
bayonets, lances, scabbards and sheaths). This database only includes 
collection of data from countries/ recognized territories to countries/ recognized 
territories. Thus, individuals that trade within the small arms industry are not part 
of the database. UNComtrade also captures civilian grades weapons which was 
combined to capture the trading patterns of the total illicit market. Both military 
and civilian weapons trade was captured for an aggregated view of the illicit 
weapons trade.  
Not all the import and export transfers will be used in the study. This 
source captures legal and grey market activity. Grey market activity was 
extracted by identifying transfers that were only reported by one of the trade 
parties.  If for example Bulgaria reports an export to Senegal for, but Senegal 
does not report receiving weapons from Bulgaria then the transfer was classified 
as grey market activity. Due to reporting requirements associated with many of 
the types of SALW included in this study, failure to report shipments is a violation 
of international trade regulations 
 Additional illicit transfer information was gathered from the Small Arms 
Survey Reports generated by the Graduate Institute of International and 
Developmental Studies located in Geneva, Switzerland. This is a government-
independent organization that researches and compiles studies on small arms 
trade and armed violence throughout the globe on a yearly basis. Sixteen 
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reports, produced by the Smalls Arm Survey (SAS), were used to fill in the gaps 
that exist in reporting by UNCOM. Due to the lack of reporting for some countries 
the SAS includes information from national/ international documents and other 
research documents. SAS has been shown to be a reliable data source with 
many researchers using it as a source of data (Erickson, 2013; Akerman and 
Seim 2014). SAS reports uncovered 314 previously unidentified illicit shipping 
paths that were added to the current dataset.  
Other data was gathered from LexisNexis, which provides news reports 
that documented the confiscation of illegal weapons. The search criteria for the 
LexisNexis search consisted of “weapons w/p seizures AND firearms OR guns 
w/p smuggling.” Other search criterion included the content type “All News” and 
geographic location was set as “World.” To avoid duplicated documents and to 
make the process easier for researchers the option of “remove duplicates with 
high-similarity” was chosen for the search. The average number of documents 
that were identified per year, once duplicates were removed, was reduced to 41, 
added 11 unique cases to the database. Using this search method, transfer 
chains were recorded that included transshipment locations. More cases were 
identified using this method from 2008 onward. These trade paths were added to 
UN Comtrade networks, which created an augmented trade network for the 
study. 
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Transfer Network Construction 
 Generating networks for each year in the study period, involved adding 
information from each data source, and then, dichotomizing the matrix. RSiena, 
the statistical software used in this project, will not support valued networks. If a 
tie exists then there is a “1”, if no tie exists then there would be a “0” in that 
position in the matrix. Although this eliminated the strength of the tie or the 
valued exchange of the weapons being sent or received, this still allowed for the 
network’s structural trade changes to be seen over time in this project (Table 2). 
Table 2 reports the basic descriptive statistics for the networks. Average 
degree and ties increase during the economic crisis and then average degree 
increase again during 2011 and 2013. Which may indicate that other factors not 
controlled for in this study are present.  
 
 
Table 2. Network Description of Illicit Trading 
Density Average Degree Ties 
2005 0.039 8.804 1972
2006 0.043 9.482 2124
2007 0.043 9.562 2124
2008 0.044 9.808 2197
2009 0.045 10.125 2268
2010 0.043 9.634 2158
2011 0.045 10.134 2270
2012 0.044 9.893 2216
2013 0.045 10.036 2248
Illicit Trading Network 
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Assessing the Completeness of Trade Data 
Benford’s Law 
 
To validate the completeness of the weapons trade data to ensure there 
are no significant gaps within the collected data, first significant digits for a 
distribution of outcome measures associated with trade activity was examined to 
see if it conformed with Benford’s law. Benford’s law originated with Simon 
Newcomb in 1881 when looking through a book of numerical logs he noticed that 
the pages for “Page 1” were worn more than those of other numbers, indicating 
that the first page was looked at more often than the other page numbers with 
the least worn being “Page 9”. Fifty years later, Frank Benford revisited 
Newcomb’s original theory by assembling 20,000 different data sources, such as 
street address and elevations of cities, in order to test the theory. Benford 
hypothesized that numbers with the leading digit of one occurred more often and 
continued in a descending pattern until the least occurring number would be nine. 
The theory states that the probability that a leading digit (d) over a large set of 
numbers with distributions over several orders of magnitude equals log10 
(1+1/d). 
𝑃(𝑑) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔10  (1 +
1
𝑑
) 
 
Benford’s law is a natural occurring phenomenon that scientists have yet to fully 
explain. It states that naturally occurring numbers one through nine occur roughly 
in the following rate by percent: ones should occur about 30% of the time, twos 
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about 18% of the time, threes about 12% of the time, fours about 10% of the 
time, fives about 8% of the time, sixes about 7% of the time, sevens about 6% of 
the time, eights about 5% of the time, and nines about 5% of the time (Benford, 
1938). 
Using Benford’s Distribution to Validate Data 
What also makes this law interesting is that the distribution will not change 
based on scale, meaning elevations in feet or kilometers still follow Benford’s 
distribution pattern. Thus, this law is ideal for the current research data. Trade 
data should be a naturally occurring set of numbers. If some trades are over 
represented while others are underrepresented this will be apparent using 
Benford’s law and allow the researcher to cite a limitation to the data. This 
approach has been used in the area of forensic accounting and economics to 
detect fraudulent behavior patterns (Gunnel and Todter, 2009). Unless an 
individual has an understanding of how Benford’s law works, they will most likely 
end up with data points that do not follow the law of naturally occurring first digit 
or leading digit numbers. When one sees patterns that significantly deviates from 
this pattern there is an indication that some kind of data manipulation has 
occurred or that parts of the data are missing. Missing data within network 
analysis research is a limitation when examining network relationships. Missing 
data can be derived using computer simulation models (Dickinson, 2014). 
However, whether this data is complete or an accurate depiction of true life 
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events needs to be validated to understand if the research performed is 
representative of the event the researchers wish to capture. 
In the research presented here, Benford’s law has been used to determine 
whether that the data observed contains significantly missing amounts of data 
and whether the data may be offset by under- or over-reporting by specific actors 
within the network. When Golbeck applied Benford’s law to social networks (i.e. 
Twitter, Facebook, Google Plus, etc.) the distribution of “friend counts” showed 
the pattern one would expect with a Benford distribution (Golbeck, 2015). This 
can be further validated with a Pearson’s correlation analysis to examine how 
closely the data adheres to Benford’s distribution. Golbeck also found that when 
the data deviated from Benford’s distribution that this can indicate, in the context 
of social media, anti-social behavior. The way in which this will be used in the 
current study is by using the in-degree and out-degree for each country for each 
year and then showing a frequency distribution of how often 1’s appear, 2’s 
appear and so on through 9. Figure 2 and 3 display an example of what this 
would look like for one year. 
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Figure 2. In-Degree Verification for 2008 Using Benford's  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Out-Degree Verification for 2008 Using Benford's  
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Independent Variables 
 
Structural Statistics 
Indirect Ties 
Structural change in trade activity can take many forms. This study will 
focus on the formation of indirect ties. Figure 2 Illustrates that two countries have 
a trading relationship among them. Country A sends country B weapons in time 
one. Country B then has an embargo placed on them. Country A wants to appear 
to the international community as complying with the embargo. 
 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of Two Countries That Have a Trading Relationship 
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When an embargo is placed on the receiving end of this relationship, the 
identification of an illegal trading pattern becomes apparent as illustrated in figure 
5. 
 
Figure 5. Indirect Tie Formation Indicating Illegal Trade Changing After An 
Embargo  
 
 
The black “X” on the line represents the presence of an embargo and the 
dissolving of this direct tie relation (Fig. 5). If the exporting state has an economic 
or political interest in continuing to export to the embargoed state, then this 
indirect tie begins to form as illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 5. As stated 
in the graph matrix example, if A wants to continue to send weapons to C, but 
wants to appear to be in compliance with the embargo, A may establish a 
relationship with country B (Table 1). The indirect state or broker of the exchange 
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(i.e., country B) may have no issue with not upholding the embargo or sanction 
that has been put in place. Country B may share a land border with country A 
making the delivery of weapons easy. The indirect trade path where A sends 
weapons to B and B forwards weapons to C are expected following an embargo. 
Prior research indicated countries such as South Africa and the United Arab 
Emirates have facilitated these types of illicit ties (Bichler and Malm 2013; Bichler 
and Franquez, 2014). In the current study, this type of indirect relationship was 
used as an interaction effect to determine if the independent variables pre-, 
during and post-embargo had an effect on the formation of indirect ties in the 
network over the study period. 
Transitivity 
Transitivity measures how nodes that are connected to others through a 
middle node will soon form a direct connection. The general formula is 
∑𝑗,ℎ𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑥𝑗ℎ𝓍𝑗ℎ 
 
Where Xij represents the tie between actor i and actor j, Xih represents the tie 
between i and actor h, and Xjh represents the tie between actor j and h. This 
study uses transitive triplets, which measures the connects between actors i, j, 
and h and the connects between them and their indirect connects as well 
(Veenstra, et.al., 2013).  
This statistic captures the tendency consistently observed in social 
networks that direct relations form among actors who have a third party in 
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common. Research finds that with longitudinal data sets, such as the one in the 
current study, there should be an increase in transitive tie formation over the 
evaluation of the network (Snijder, Van de Bunt, and Steglich, 2010). While there 
are different ways a group of three actors can become interconnected, Figure 6 
illustrates how indirect connections may lead to the formation of a direct 
connection over time.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Transitivity Model 
 
Out-Degree Density 
      
𝑠1𝑙(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑖+ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑗
 
This statistic capture the number of ties an actor extends as illustrated in 
Figure 7. In the current project, this statistic can be used to examine the reach or 
actors that are participating in the exporting of illegal weapons through new 
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outgoing tie formations. Thus, out-degree density helps to identify newly formed 
trade relationships that were not open previously (Prell, 2012). When calculating 
out-degree density one looks at the out-degree of one actor for example, Sierra 
Leone from case study, look at Slovakia in that trade network. When one looks at 
out-degree you first count how many total nodes, in this case countries are in the 
total network. This network has a possibility of 11 choices to send out to. When 
one looks just at the outgoing trades from Slovakia there are 2. The out-degree 
density then becomes 2/11 which is .18.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Out-degree looks at the number of ties a node sends out. 
 
 
44 
 
Reciprocity 
Dynamic models of network change must include a measure of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity is the tendency of something to be returned through the same path. 
Over time networks will exhibit more reciprocation (Snijders et al., 2010) and this 
tendency extends to weapons trade (e.g., Bichler and Franquez, 2014; Kinsella, 
2003). The general equation for reciprocity is 
 
𝑠𝑖2 (𝜒) =  ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑗
𝑥𝑗𝑖 
 
As used here, reciprocity measures that if actor A exported weapons to 
actor B, then at some point B will send back weapons to A (Figure 8).  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Reciprocity measures relationships between node A and B. 
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Covariates 
Embargo (Stochastic Shock) 
Embargoes as a variable are dynamic and defined as any trade restriction 
implemented by one governing body on a country, territory, or organization. 
Embargoes can be implemented on states and groups due to interstate war, civil 
war, and/or international terrorism. The main purpose for embargoes is to 
improve local, national, and international peace and security. This study focuses 
on small arms embargoes often referred to as smart sanctions, because they 
specifically direct the restriction of specific goods or service rather than restricting 
all trade. Typically, a small arms embargo is placed on a country/ territory 
because of international law violations such as money laundering, human rights 
violations, and affiliation with terrorist organizations. This dataset was built using 
several different sources of information that include sanctions by the European 
Union, the UN, and the US. Since a country can be sanctioned by different 
agencies, a dichotomous coding scheme will be used to identify the years when 
an embargo is in place. If a country/territory had a small arms embargo from any 
of these agencies, then they received a 1 for that year. If the country/territory had 
no small arms embargo during that year then they received a 0 for that year. 
Because this changes over time, this will be a dynamic variable. 
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Control of Corruption (Dynamic Control Variable) 
Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. This 
data was procured from the Worldwide Governance Indicator 
(http://infor.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/), which looks at how a public power 
uses checks and balances that will discourage corruption, decreasing illicit trade 
through or within their region (Cukier, 2008; Parker, 2010). This network upon 
initial inspection showed less than 10% of the data was missing. Average scores 
of similar countries or territories were used to replace missing corruption scores. 
Highest levels of control were ranked at 100. Each country has a score they 
receive each year which is compiled from different government and watch dog 
sources. The scores cover different attributes ranging from rule of law to political 
instability to come up with a total corruption score. An example of what this 
database looks like occurs in Table 3 below: 
 
 
Table 3. Corruption Database. 
 
 
 
UN CODE COUNTRY_NAME_IN_TRADE_DATAMISSING 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 AVG 100-AVG (WITH HIGHER IS BAD)
4 AFGHANISTAN 2.0 2.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.95 1.42 1.91 1.91 1.3 98.7
8 ALBANIA 25.4 22.4 28.2 36.9 38.3 36.67 28.44 26.79 25.84 25.8 74.2
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Table 4 reports that the average score for control of corruption across all nations 
and the years examined (grand mean) is 53.12. This indicates that the average 
score for corruption is in the middle of the scale indicating most countries have a 
give and take with secrecy and transparency.  
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for all Covariates  
 
Corruption GDP Economic Crisis  
Mean 53.12 $277,790.58 -4.02 
Median 51.63 $14,170.93 -3.52 
SD 1.93 $1,180,364.22 13.11 
Min 0.98 $30.94 -39.35 
Max 99.71 $14,886,455.56 84.73 
N  224 224 224 
 
 
 
This data was recoded using ordinal levels 1 through 3, or low, medium, and 
high.  This was done for easier interpretation of results. To make this data usable 
for the RSiena software the data points were copied into a notepad txt file without 
decimal points. No column or row names moved to the txt file as RSiena is not 
able to process this type of information. All information must be kept coded in the 
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same order for all 224 countries so that interpretation of results is not 
misunderstood due to coding errors. 
Gross Domestic Product (Dynamic Control Variable) 
GDP is measured as the gross sum of all resident producers within an 
economy with values in U.S dollars. This is a dynamic variable because it can 
change over time due to the growth or decline of a country’s economy. These 
data were gathered from the World Bank and the GDP was converted by dividing 
each country’s GDP by the global total. This allowed for uniform scores to be 
analyzed. The purpose in using GDP levels to understand the effectiveness of 
embargoes is to see if those that have high GDP scores will also be more likely 
to comply with embargoes. Countries with high GDPs would show signs of 
growth within their economy. One might assume that trade would be less likely 
for those under an embargo, as to not disrupt their stable infrastructure. 
However, higher GDP scores with economic growth also places a country in the 
position, and means, to buy arms. Embargoes cause an increase in product price 
due to the unavailability through legal channels. One might assume that those 
countries with higher GDPs would be more likely to use this economic advantage 
to buy more arms. It should be noted that Bresson-Cartier (1997) found that 
corruption and GDP had high levels of multi-collinearity (Bresson-Cartier, 1997). 
The researcher in that case stated that using GDP and corruption as two 
independent variables may not be well suited. This was tested with the 
correlation analysis prior to being included in the final model. In order to simplify 
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this data set and to load it into RSiena, an ordinal coding approach was taken. 
This variable is dynamic as it does vary slightly each year through the study 
period. Each year was coded separately and the following code was given to 
each country that fell into each category. Countries that had a GDP from 0 – 999 
million were coded 1, 1 billion to 999 billion were 2, and 1 trillion and higher were 
coded at 3. Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of world’s wealth over the study 
period. As one can see, almost three quarters of the countries studied during the 
time period fell into the middle GDP bracket, while only a small percentage were 
in the highest bracket, and 20% were in the lowest bracket (Fig. 9).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of GDP Over the Study Period. 
 
20%
74%
6%
GDP Over Study Period
0 – 999 million 1 billion to 999 billion 1 trillion and higher
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Economic Crisis (Static Control Variable) 
This study period included the economic crisis that occurred in the United 
States during 2008. The crisis was brought on by predatory lending practices, 
which had a rippling effect across the global economy. The purpose in using this 
variable as a control in this study is to acknowledge that the event occurred, and 
had some impact on the global market. The way in which this variable was coded 
is as follows: the GDP for 2008 and 2009 were used to show the percent change 
over time between these two-time periods. That percent change was then coded 
on an ordinal scale from 0 to 4. The following is the description of that scale: 0 
being no effect or positive effect, 1 being low effect, 2 medium, 3 medium to high, 
and 4 high effect. The following graph shows the effect distribution over the time 
period of 2008 to 2009. Please reference table 4 for descriptive statistics.  
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Figure 10.  Distribution of Economic Effect. 
 
 
Analytic Plan Using Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models 
 
Stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOM) give a researcher the ability to 
look at changes over time based on past and present observations. The appeal 
of SAOM is the ability to incorporate several different micro level choices that 
actors can make. In the current project, the decision to continue to trade arms 
despite the establishment of an arms embargo becomes the determining factor 
for illegal activity. This dynamic modeling process allows the researcher to 
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examine not only the changes that occur over time with the illegal trading of arms 
(i.e., transitivity, new connects, or the discontinuation of connects), but also the 
variables that affect those trade relationships that are themselves time sensitive. 
In the current project the time frame is 2005 to 2013 so that 8 observations 
between years are calculated. To clarify, the model looks at the formation of new 
ties, the death of ties, the closure of transitive triplets, if the reciprocity of ties 
increases, and any other relational changes between nodes between T1 and T2. 
This is accomplished using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method, which looks 
at the current state in the network in year T1 and T2, models that change, and 
builds on it based on known data. This is a maximum likelihood probability 
process where random selections are made from the current state of the network 
to model new networks and the probability of those outcomes (McDonald, Smith 
and Forster, 2007). This is a method that allows for probability analysis of very 
large sets of numbers although small sets can also be used. However, when 
large sets need to be examined this is the appropriate method to use. 
To simplify, let’s say you have a pile of black and white beans and you 
randomly pick half the beans for one pile and half the beans for another pile. 
Imagine that these two piles represent the state of the beans at two different 
points in time. If you pick one bean out of pile 1 the probability of the color of the 
bean you picked is based on the probability of the random selection from the first 
pick of beans when you separated them, as well as the probability of the current 
state of the beans, coupled with the probability of what your future picks could 
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be. When applied to a very simple network of four friends this may start to make 
a little more sense. Figure 11 represents our four friends’ network at a current 
state in time. If you want to know what the network of friends might look like over 
time you could randomly select different configurations of the same network of 
friends to see how they might be connected. Using the Markov Chain method, 
the program takes the probability of the choices A could make that would benefit 
A the most. It does the same with each node in the network, coming up with a 
new configuration through as many iterations as the researcher predetermines. 
All those networks put together are given calculated averages that allow the 
researcher to see the probability of network changes over time. 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Basic Network of Five Counties Trade Pattern for t1 
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Figure 11 allows researchers to understand how changes will occur when 
independent variables are placed into the model. In the current project one such 
independent variable will be embargoes. The change this project will examine is 
whether an embargo is not in place one year and then is placed the next and vice 
versa, what type of changes will be observed in trading behavior? Back to our 
bean example, the probability of choices is determined by the past state, current 
state, and future state. What was the probability of picking a black bean the first 
time, plus the current probability of picking a black bean, and then the probability 
of picking a black bean in the future from the bean pile? Changes such as 
alternative routes may be seen to deviate from the previous point of travel, but 
the weapons may still be entering the sanctioned country regardless of the 
embargo. These structural statistics of the previously described network are 
structural independent. 
 The fit of independent measures (data parameters) will be assessed by 
running t-ratios (Snijder et al., 2010). If the t-ratios are >0.1, then statistical 
estimates will be used to interpret changes and characteristics about the 
network. If the t-ratio is <0.1, then the statistical estimation will be noted and not 
used to make interpretations about the network. The Jaccard coefficient is used 
to evaluate network stability over time. 
 The Jaccard coefficient examines the stability of the network allowing 
researchers to look at the similarities between observation times. If the networks 
are too similar then the network is not changing enough over time. If the network 
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has too many changes from time one to time two, then these can be thought of 
as two different networks. The ideal coefficient that would show the right amount 
of change with not too much change would be 0.2 to 0.6. The calculation is as 
follows: 
𝑥11
𝑥11 + 𝑥01 + 𝑥10
 
 
Where X11 represents the number of ties between nodes at both moments in 
time, divided by the number of ties present at both moments plus X01 the number 
of newly formed ties, plus X10 the number of terminated ties. As stated previously, 
ratios of 0.2 to 0.6 are ideal to allow researchers, in good faith, to proceed with 
continued analysis of the networks considering them to be the same network at 
two different moments in time (Kinsella, 2003). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
 
Data Quality 
Missing or manipulated data poses substantive problems for network 
analysis because analytics assume that networks are complete. Before 
beginning an analysis of the illicit trade networks involved in moving small arms, 
trade activity captured in this study were compared to the distribution expected 
for naturally occurring numbers as suggested by Benford’s law of first significant 
digits. Comparing study data to an expected distribution provides a mechanism 
to assess whether the study data are complete enough to be a reasonable 
representation of the phenomena under investigation. Comparing distributions is 
a commonly accepted practice in forensic accounting and economics to detect 
incomplete or manipulated data that may be indicative of fraudulent behavior 
(Gunnel and Todter, 2009). Unless an individual understands how Benfords’ law 
works they will most likely end up with data points that do not follow the law of 
naturally occurring first digit or leading digit numbers.   
Out-degree centrality for each nation captures the number of observed 
trade partners weapons are shipped to illicitly (export). This structural statistic 
was calculated for each nation, for each year observed. A frequency distribution 
of first significant digits (non-zero digits) was compared against the expected 
distribution as suggested by Benford’s law. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
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reports the correspondence in distribution: With an r of .99 and a Chi Square of 
.06, there is a strong relationship. It is acceptable to conclude that the distribution 
of first significant digits obtained for out-degree centrality conforms to Benford’s 
expected distribution and one can see as well how closely the two-distributions 
follow each other on the graph. Some variation is to be expected as unknown 
missing data is expected in network analysis.  
 
 
Table 5. Benfords’ Expected Distribution Verses Out-Degree Values Observed 
1st Sig. Digit Benford’s Expected 
Distribution of 1st 
Sig. Digit 
Distribution of 1st Sig. Digit 
for Out degree Centrality 
Difference 
1 0.30 0.33 -0.03 
2 0.18 0.22 -0.04 
3 0.13 0.15 -0.02 
4 0.10 0.09 0.01 
5 0.08 0.07 0.01 
6 0.07 0.05 0.02 
7 0.06 0.04 0.02 
8 0.05 0.03 0.02 
9 0.05 0.01 0.04 
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Figure 12. Linear Relationship Between Benfords’ Distribution and Out-Degree 
 
Jaccard Coefficient 
Dynamic modeling requires a certain level of change between 
observations to be viable. The Jaccard coefficient of similarity provides a metric 
for assessing change: Jaccard calculates the amount of change between each 
observation of a network.  Values range from 0 to 1.0 and networks should 
exhibit scores of .3 to .6 to indicate that there is enough change between 
successive networks to support running a stochastic actor-oriented model. If the 
change were too great, beyond a .6, we would have to consider the possibility 
that each observation captures a different network not one simply evolving over 
time.  
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Table 6 shows the number of tie formations for each observation period. 
Recall that 0 indicates no trade activity and 1 indicates trading. Thus, the two 
types of change assessed are the formation of a trade tie (changing from no 
relation during the first observation, coded as 0, to a 1, indicating a trade relation 
in the subsequent observation) and the termination of a trade relation (1 to 0). 
Jaccard Coefficients are calculated as proportion of same trade ties (1 to 1) 
relative to all change and trade (0 to 1, 1 to 0, and 1 to 1). Non-trading relations 
that continue to be non-trading relations are not included in this calculation. All 
Jaccard Coefficients are within the expected range, suggesting that stochastic 
actor-oriented modeling is feasible. Notably, there is a slight increase in stability 
over time: From 2005 to 2006, .376 (or 37.6%) of observed relations continued, 
whereas from 2012 to 2013, .416 (or 41.6%) of trade continued.  
 
 
Table 6. Tie Changes between Subsequent Observations 
Observation 
Periods 
Number of  
Same Ties 
Number of 
Changed Ties 
 
Jaccard 
Coefficient  
 0 to 0 1 to1  0 to 1  1 to 0   
2005 to 2006 46976 1120 1004 852  0.376 
2006 to 2007 46870 1184 958 940  0.384 
2007 t0 2008 46850 1237 960 905  0.399 
2008 to 2009 46744 1257 1011 940  0.392 
2009 to 2010 46794 1268 890 1000  0.402 
2010 to 2011 46813 1289 981 869  0.411 
2011 to 2012 46767 1301 915 969  0.408 
2012 to 2013 46800 1312 936 904  0.416 
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Baseline Model 
Estimated Effects 
The first model reported in Table 7 is the baseline model. This model 
includes three structural measures and two control variables. The structural 
measures capture out degree density, reciprocity, and transitive triplets. Due to 
the nature of the current study, the models are looking at how the structural 
measures change over time. The economic crisis variable controls for the effect 
that the 2008 financial crisis had on nations’ trading capacity, and control of 
corruption, is a World Bank measure capturing the ability of nations to control 
corruption. Control of corruption is a proxy for the porousness of border controls.  
Effects are interpreted differently than regression models. The effects 
reported are calculated as an evaluative function. Thus, a positive effect is a 
tendency of nations to exhibit a preference for something and a negative score is 
a tendency not to exhibit change. For example, a positive effect size for 
economic crisis would indicate that nations with higher scores on the economic 
crisis covariate would tend to exhibit greater change in the trade activity.  
Out-degree density exhibited a strong and significant decline across the 
observation period. Show a propensity for nations to exhibit a tendency not to 
become more enmeshed in a dense trade network.  This may be indicative of a 
polarization or decentralization of illicit trade activity.  Examining how the illicit 
trade network evolves throughout the study period, we see that there is a 
tendency for nations to reciprocate trade activity over time, meaning country A 
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sends to country B over time country B will start sending to country A. Recall that 
transitive triplet where country A and country B trade and country B and C trade. 
Then, country A and C decide to trade due to the trading relationship that they 
both have with country B. These tendencies to trade with one’s trading partners 
increase over time, showing an indication for less branching out away from one’s 
existing trade ties.  
Model Fit and Robustness of Estimates 
Estimate robustness is estimated by t ratios. When T-ratios are above .3, 
the model is having trouble reaching convergence. The estimate is unstable, and 
this suggests that the variable should not be carried forward: In the base model, 
corruption had a t-ratio of .44, and as such, this variable was not included in 
subsequent models. Examining model performance with the addition of variables 
and removal of covariates with high T-ratios provides some indication of 
subsequent models exhibit a better fit: In each model, covariates and interactions 
were added, and then removed, based on this ratio.  The two co-variants 
included in the baseline model were economic crisis and corruptions. Economic 
crisis was coded by looking at the percent change of the GDP from 2008 to 2009. 
Based on the effect the crisis had on the GDP decreasing gave the country a 
score 1 to 4 smallest effect to largest effect. In the model, positive scores in 
economic crisis indicate greater for nations experiencing the most change in 
GDP also exhibited a tendency toward changing illicit trade activity. The 
descriptive statistics for economic crisis are reported below.   
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Control variants corruption and GDP were thought to have some type of 
multi-collinearity issues. One simple baseline model originally ran with the two in 
the model and subsequent models would fail when the two were included.  These 
covariates also had poorly performing t ratios as well suggesting that 
convergence in the model was difficult. Another issue with these two variants 
was the min and max ranges were high, one of the reasons that economic crisis 
may have performed better. Although economic crisis is made up of GDP it 
stabilized the high range gap that was present. Another reason that economic 
crisis had less performance issues may have been in part, to it being a static 
variable. Both GDP and corruption were dynamic variables and this dynamic 
nature made convergence difficult in the model. If it were coded nominally or with 
an average score over all, better performing scores may have been seen.   
 
Covariate Models 
Model Estimates 
Following precedent, model development progressed through three 
iterative phases testing sets of covariates. Covariate performance was tested, 
and poorly converging and non-significant covariates, were removed in 
subsequent models (Snijders, Van De Bunt & Steglish, 2010). This process is 
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important to building the final, most parsimonious model as some covariates may 
mask the influence of others.1  
Model 2 included all structural statistics and economic crisis, as well as 
pre-, during, and post embargo effects. No interaction effects were included. The 
structural statistics continue to show increased reciprocity and even great 
transitive triplets over time. The influence that an embargo has on this increase 
will be discussed further in the following section. Change during pre-embargo 
time periods seemed to decrease in this model, indicating less change during this 
period.  While the greatest change was observed during embargos, the 
parameter estimates suggest that illicit trade activity also changes post embargo. 
In addition, nations that experienced more effects during the economic crisis are 
also going to see increased changes in trading activity.  
Model 3 is the full model including, structural statistics, economic crisis, 
embargo effects, as well as the interaction effects of embargoes and in-direct 
ties. Out-degree continues to decrease over time in this model. While changes in 
reciprocity and transitive triplets continue to increase with the highest inclination 
to change with transitive triplets, the direct effect of being in a pre-embargo 
period decreases and nations exhibit a tendency toward the use of indirect ties. 
Post embargo, nations also exhibit a tendency toward indirect trade ties, albeit a 
lesser effect than during embargo.  
                                                 
1 Snijders et al. 2010 suggest trial and error of model testing to come up with the most parsimonious model 
possible. Notably, when there is too much covariance between covariates, convergence is difficult to reach 
and the model to stop running. This was the case in the current study with combination of corruption, GDP, 
coupled with the complex nature of the interaction effects with embargoes.  
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Model 4 is the most parsimonious model, including only significant 
covariates. Overall, nations involved in illicit trade in small arms exhibit a decline 
in out-degree density, an increase in reciprocal trades, and a preference for 
transitive triplets. Nations under embargo exhibit a preference for indirect trade 
activity. This is a robust finding. Post embargo, nations also exhibit a preference 
for indirect relations. Economic crisis in this model does have a positive 
significant effect on change, meaning that those more effected by economic 
crisis have a tendency to exhibit change more frequently over time. The highest 
effect for the parsimonious model was during embargo interaction on indirect 
ties. Stating that those that have an embargo on them will have tendency to 
establish more ties that are indirect; further signifying that networks exhibit a 
chain like structure with less density. 
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Table 7. Parameters Models 1 and 2  
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Table 8. Parameters Models 3 and 4  
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Diagnostic Investigation of Parsimonious Model 
Inter-item correlations may adversely affect model estimates. 
Consequently, Table 9 shows the bivariate correlations for the final model. Any 
coefficient below .10 is too small of a relationship to be influencing these 
coefficients and any value above .9 is a potential threat. Several moderately 
strong inverse relationships exist, but none surpasses the .9 threshold. Of 
interest, higher trade relations exhibiting transitive triplets are associated with 
lower out-degree density (correlation coefficient -.426, p < .001), suggesting that 
as chain-like relations increase we find less density. Another relatively high 
correlation was the interaction effect during embargoes and indirect ties 
(correlation coefficient -.0499) and transitive triplets. One can see from the 
correlation matrix that there are several inverse relationships with out-degree 
which is evident in the model results with decreasing effect over time. This further 
demonstrates reliability of the results obtained in model 4.  
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Table 9. Bivariate Correlation Analysis  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Out-Degree – – – – – – – – 
Reciprocity -0.212 – – – – – – – 
Transitive Triplets -0.426 -0.308 – – – – – – 
Econ Crisis -0.104 -0.092 0.085 – – – – – 
During Embargo 0.037 0.012 -0.027 0.102 – – – – 
During Embargo x 
Indirect Ties 
0.116 0.111 -0.499 -0.171 0.267 – – – 
Post Embargo -0.062 -0.042 0.175 0.078 -0.047 -0.289 – – 
Post Embargo x 
Indirect Ties 
0.074 -0.002 -0.063 0.09 0.126 0.161 -0.086 – 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
This study examines the evolution of illicit trade of small arms and light 
weapons using information drawn from U.N. Comtrade records of weapons 
transfers and reported seizures gleaned from special reports published by the 
Small Arms Survey or reported in the news. The resulting networks include illegal 
shipments and grey market trade behavior, where one partner to the trade does 
not confirm the trade (not fully reported) to authorities, often for political or 
strategic reasons. Mapping trade activity in this way, the present study 
investigated whether the imposition of weapons embargoes changed trade 
activity for the nations under sanction.  To provide context for these effects, 
structural statistics measured how the overall illegal trade network evolved over 
time. The hypotheses are restated below: 
H1  Controlling for fiscal health, GDP, and ability to control corruption, 
nations under embargo will exhibit greater change in trade activity 
with a preference towards indirect ties.  
H2  Controlling for fiscal health, GDP, and ability to control corruption, 
nations will exhibit a preference for indirect transfers when 
embargos are lifted (post-embargo period).  
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H3 Nations under fiscal duress will exhibit greater change.  
Implications 
Market Context 
 
Out-Degree Results show lower out-degree density was seen in all four 
models over time. Over time, illicit and grey market trade in SALW exhibits less 
density. In a global market of weapon trading there are few major producers, 
which could also account for the lower out-degree density. With only about 6 
major arms producing countries worldwide this low out-degree score is 
foreseeable. According to Snijders et. al. 2010 global networks in a perfect world 
function on a hierarchy with those on the bottom showing higher out-degree 
measures while those at the top have lower out-degree scores. 
Reciprocity Consistent with other social network research, illicit and grey 
market trade activity favors reciprocity. Over time, if one country gives out 
weapons as an in-kind gift and some of those weapons are not used then some 
of the weapons will be returned to the contributing country. If you trade with one 
country over time from prior research, it is understood that the importer of the 
trade relationship will reciprocate the tie. As reciprocity increases over time, there 
is an increase in transitive triplets with these results as well.  
Transitive Triplets The reciprocated ties reported on above could actually 
be part of the transitive triplet relationship as well. Reciprocation can be within 
transitive triplets. The results indicate an increase in transitive triplets meaning 
country A trades with country B, country B trades with country C, over time 
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country A and C will have some kind of trading relationship. Transitive triplet 
behavior is indicative of closure in the network (Snijder, 2005). Lower density in 
the a decreased tendency to establish ties away from reciprocity supporting the 
increased closure with transitive triplets.  Which further supports lower density; 
which was found in the current study, with lowering out-degree effects. As well, a 
greater support for the idea that illegal network trade activity is built with tie 
formations that are not easily broken (Bresson-Cartier, 1997) with simple 
embargo implementations strategies. 
 
Embargo Effects  
The results indicate; when accounting for fiscal health, during embargo 
implementation periods do show greater shifts of change towards indirect ties. 
Although the effect is lower, there is a tendency towards change in trade during 
post embargo periods. Prior research indicated greater change in trade during 
and post embargo periods (Bichler and Malm, 2013; Bichler and Franques, 
2014). Bresson-Cartier (1997), argued that as countries acquired more weapons 
their policy decisions became more aggressive. This maybe an indication of why 
greater levels of change are seen during and post embargo periods.  
Indirect tie formation is an indication of a chain like formation. This should 
open up the conversation on the global platform on how to deal with these 
transshipment points, and how to evaluate the routine activities of these 
convergence points within the network.  
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The highest effects were seen in the parsimonious model (model 4), 
during embargo implementation period and the interaction effect of indirect tie 
formations. Bresson-Cartier (1997), study goes to support these findings that the 
risk of continuing to trade during an embargoed time frame does not outweigh 
the benefit of the continued trade relationship: These trading relationships can be 
something that is well established. The interaction effect of during embargo and 
indirect ties was over double that of the interaction with post embargo and 
indirect ties. Although pre embargo was not used in the final model, in model 3 
pre embargo and pre embargo interaction effect do have effect on change in the 
network. This change can be seen for preferential towards indirect ties. This 
could be the start of what is seen later during the embargo implementation period 
where there is a greater effect on indirect tie formation. 
 
Control Variables  
Fiscal duress in the model did show significance towards change in the 
network. Countries that exhibit higher effects from economic crisis had greater 
tendency of change occurring. Using this as a control variable further illustrates 
how legal market issues permeate into illegal markets (Bichler and Malm, 
2013).To see how this variable further effects change in the network additional 
analysis would be needed. Such as interaction effects with economic crisis and 
indirect ties, or reciprocity. Overall, the results gained from this variable show 
insight into how fiscal health effects change in the illegal arms trade. Sufficiently 
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enough to explain its’ presence in these models and continued research into its 
effect.  
Notably, it was discovered when coding economic crisis that the effects of 
this fiscal problem was not restricted to United States, it did have an effect on the 
global economy. This variable had an effect on change in trading behavior; 
countries that exhibited higher effects from the economic crisis would see more 
change over time. This also adds to the idea that the U.N. needs to have greater 
oversight in the area of fiscal health on countries going through economic turmoil.   
Although control of corruption although it performed poorly in the first model,  
the effect size, though small, did have an effect on change in the network. This 
variable should be considered for future research.  
The covariate for GDP variable did not perform well on its own in the first trial 
runs. Initially GDP was considered important to have to use as a control variable. 
As stated previously this study was analyzing data that was not reported 
accurately 100% of the time, this is why it was included in the network.  
 
Theory 
Illegal networks, based on the information gathered here, may be sparse 
networks made up of close-knit relationships that remain stable over time and 
greater trade activity is seen among trusted reciprocated ties (Kinsella, 2007). 
Prior research also suggested that a rational choice perspective maybe in play 
for these trading decisions (Kinsella, 1998).  Using routine activity theory one can 
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examine what Sampson, Eck and Dunham (2010), called the super controllers on 
this national level of trading that is occurring. Economic and social influencers in 
the current study are those that are going through economic crisis or low fiscal 
health. This covariate showed to positively effect change in the network. Further 
research should look at how this variable could be influenced to influence 
intimate handlers within the illicit weapons trading network. What this current 
study looked at is just the illicit weapons trade, but one must remember that this 
is part of a much bigger network of corporate financers, social groups, and 
political parties. What does routine activities theory say about the results found in 
the current study? That illicit weapons are part of a large network of smaller 
individuals that are not necessarily affected by the implementation of an 
embargo. As opportunities present themselves with adequate targets and lack of 
controls illegal weapons trade continuous and will continue to operate. That the 
individuals that make up this market are not necessarily seeking out to commit 
these crimes and in some case may be unaware of the crime that have 
committed. For example the port master decides that with his allotted time only 
every 10th shipping container will be inspected. He is going about his normal 
routines not aware that his routine has allowed 9 containers of illicit weapons to 
pass through his port.   
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Policy 
Greater investment from United Nations to create stable committees, that 
would act as third party liaisons to help settle disputes and reports of violence. 
The previous example in the literature was that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and 
how the U.N. was dealing with the atrocious human rights violation that area. The 
embargo was put in place in 1996 and called for members to cease the import of 
all military assistants, called for the ruling party to ceasefire and peacefully 
resolve their issues. The fighting continued into the early 2000s’ and the U.N. 
provided need based services to those affected by war. The requests for peace 
were not followed and no true consequences were applied. What needs to 
happen is greater intervening by third parties to ensure peace talks are 
performed and acting governmental authorities are held accountable to global 
criminal courts when human rights are violated. Third party mitigation needs to 
come be made up of long-term committee members that have a vested interest 
in peace and stability. In the case study previously discussed, in Sierra Leone, 
the third party committee sent in to establish order and peace often turned away 
from continued violence. The committee did not want to upset the RUF with 
regulations for peace. The committee members are often short-term workers that 
have no stake in seeing a long process through. International courts need to be 
more active in holding violators of arms embargoes accountable to the gross 
human rights violations that are likely to occur from the import of weapons to war 
torn regions. Another area that needs addressing from the U.N. is before the 
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situation turns into human rights violation, fiscal health issues should be 
addressed.  
As the current study shows, fiscal health does have an effect on illegal 
arms trade. This finding suggests that it is important to identify countries with 
fiscal health issues and addressing those issues, whether these issues are due 
to lack of resources or misappropriated funds, before weapons flood the region. 
Finding the root cause of the issue and addressing that. If the root cause of the 
problem is misappropriating funding stepping in and helping to balance budgets, 
where world leaders are concerned about fiscal responsibility. This redistribution 
of budgeting goes towards a stabilization on the infrastructure. From a lower level 
approach better pay and benefits to those that are involved with border and 
shipment points to help cut down on the temptation of bribes. This includes those 
that are in governmental positions   
The previous policy changes could help, but they are only implementing 
policies at one level of the network. When taking routine activities into 
consideration and the number of intimate handlers and guardians at different 
levels one needs to stop implementing blanket policies and start drilling down to 
lower level policies that will have greater impact. A suggestion for these types of 
policy changes could focus on port workers and supervisors. Creating greater 
monitoring on them and their daily tasks. Also, civil penalties for companies that 
knowing and unknowing allow weapons to permeate through their access points.  
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Limitations  
Although an analysis of first significant digits suggests that the weapons 
transfer data used in this study are relatively complete, network analysis is highly 
sensitive to missing data. Missing from this study is the legal trade network: The 
legal network was not included in the study although studies confirm that legal 
and illegal markets have a continuous give and take relationship between them 
(Bichler and Malm, 2013). The complex nature of stochastic models coupled with 
the examination of two interdependent networks longitudinally is beyond the 
scope of this project. Not including the legal network in the overall project limits 
the results to only illegal change in the network giving a small snap shot of a 
much larger network. Although the current study looks at indirect tie interactions 
one can only interpret other covariant and structural statistics to change.  
Control variables GDP and corruption may have not performed as well 
due to the fact that these were treated as dynamic variables. Coding issues with 
both variables may have caused other instability issues as well. As stated 
previously GDP does not have issues of shady reporting practices. When 
compared to an illegal network data which, exists only due to its shady reporting 
issues, their comparability becomes questionable. Another issue with GDP was 
that it was dynamically coded when it should have been a static variable. This 
measure could be used with a legal trade network but consideration as a variable 
with illegal trade might need to be dropped. Due to the previous problem stated 
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illegal activity is activity that is no reported 100% of the time while GDP is 
reported.  
 
Future Research  
Future research needs to look at the legal and illegal network 
simultaneously to better understand change due to the interconnect ability of the 
two networks. In addition, studies could use a different way to measure fiscal 
health, perhaps using a static measure of GDP or a different source of data. 
Moreover, control of corruption did not vary over time, a static variable would be 
more effective. . Future research should also consider using more interaction 
effects to account for specific change over time. Networks by nature are complex 
taking multiple variables, such as characteristic, spatial and temporal effects into 
consideration is essential to fuller understand the multifaceted nature of change 
why that change occurs.   
Other considerations for future research is identifying the death of trade ties. 
While this research focused on the formation of ties, looking at the death of ties 
may be a better indicator of true movement. This could also be coupled with tie 
formation to get a larger picture of change activity.  
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Conclusion 
 Embargoes are routinely implemented by the international community to 
restrict the flow of small arms and light weapons into politically unstable regions. 
The effectiveness of sanctions fall into question when reports indicate that 
weapons continue to pour into embargoed territories. Using stochastic actor-
based modeling, the current study investigates how shipment patterns change 
over time, and how trade patterns evolve in the presence of endogenous 
influences, such as embargoes, while controlling for corruption levels and 
national wealth (e.g., gross domestic product). The results here indicate that 
embargoes do indeed shift trade during their implementation periods. The trade 
shift is seen in indirect tie. The second point of interest from this study was the 
use of stochastic actor-oriented models as an analysis tool for the study of large 
complex illegal markets. Although limitations exist in this study, i.e., control 
covariates performed poorly, this study did illustrate this type of analysis is a 
credible analytic technique for future research. This work gave insight into the 
shifting illicit trade pre, during and post embargo and how policies should be 
refocused to better establish enforcement efforts to counter balance these shift 
trade behaviors.  
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